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Do decisions from description and from experience trigger different cognitive processes?
We investigated this general question using cognitive modeling, eye-tracking, and phys-
iological arousal measures. Three novel ﬁndings indeed suggest qualitatively different
processes between the two types of decisions. First, comparative modeling indicates
that evidence-accumulation models assuming averaging of all ﬁxation-sampled outcomes
predict choices best in decisions from experience, whereas Cumulative Prospect Theory
predicts choices best in decisions from descriptions. Second, arousal decreased with
increasing difference in expected value between gambles in description-based choices
but not in experience. Third, the relation between attention and subjective weights given
to outcomes was stronger for experience-based than for description-based tasks. Overall,
our results indicate that processes in experience-based risky choice can be captured by
sampling-and-averaging evidence-accumulation model. This model cannot be generalized
to description-based decisions, in which more complex mechanisms are involved.
Keywords: risky choices, description vs. experience gap, sampling, eye-tracking, evidence-accumulation, prospect
theory
INTRODUCTION
According to standards of rationality, choices between risky
prospects should depend on the utility of possible outcomes and
their respective probabilities. Choices should thus be invariant to
different formats of information presentation. Classic work, how-
ever, has shown that this invariance assumption is systematically
violated: for example, framing effects (e.g., presenting information
in terms of gains vs. losses) have a profound effect both on choice
behavior (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Kühberger, 1998;
Maule and Villejoubert, 2007) and judgments (e.g., Hilbig, 2009,
2012). Recently, there has been an upsurge of interest in the inﬂu-
ence of one speciﬁc aspect of information presentation, namely
whether choice-relevant information is exhaustively described or
actively sampled, that is, experienced.
A growing body of research suggests a “gap” between decisions
that are based on description and decisions that are based on
experience (Barron and Erev, 2003; Hertwig et al., 2004; Erev and
Barron, 2005; Yechiam et al., 2005a; Jessup et al., 2008). Indeed,
this gap was recently corroborated on a neuronal level (FitzGerald
et al., 2010). In description-based risky choice, the outcomes and
their respective probabilities are fully described for both options.
By contrast, in experience-based decisions, no such conclusive
information is provided; rather, participants have to learn which
outcomes might occur and what their approximate probabilities
are through experience. For example, Barron and Erev (2003)
presented the following choice problem to participants: get three
points for sure vs. get four points with 0.8 probability, and zero
points otherwise. Instead of receiving such a full description of the
options,participantswere required tomake 400 selections between
the two gambles by pressing one of two unmarked buttons. Each
selection returned an outcome drawn from the underlying payoff
structure of the corresponding option. The accumulated outcomes
were converted into money and paid to the participants. Accord-
ing to previous ﬁndings, participants in an all gain domain should
prefer the safer option due to (myopic) risk aversion (e.g., Kah-
neman and Tversky, 1979). By contrast, Barron and Erev (2003)
found a preference for the riskier option (66%) when participants
based their choices on experience. This difference betweendescrip-
tion vs. experience-based decisions concerning the preference for
risky options (and other choice phenomena) is considered the
descriptions-experience-“gap” (Hertwig and Erev, 2009)1.
1Note, however, that the choice problem in Barron and Erev (2003) differed from
a description-based task not only by in terms of how information was acquired.
Rather, whereas description-based tasks usually require a one-shot decision, the
feedback task used inBarron andErev required participants tomake repeated choices
with feedback, all of which had monetary consequences. To rule out that speciﬁ-
cally this feedback aspect may have driven the “gap,” subsequent research replicated
the “gap” in a one-shot experience-based task (i.e., sampling task): Participants
again sample single outcomes drawn from each of the choice options. However,
none of these samples is consequential. Instead, after the sampling phase, partic-
ipants make a single consequential choice (e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004). Although
both experience-based paradigms reveal choice patterns that differ from those
typically found in the description-based paradigm, recent research also indicates
considerable differences between the two experience-based tasks. Speciﬁcally, the
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While the description-experience “gap” has been found con-
sistently, there still are open questions concerning the underlying
cognitive mechanisms (Hertwig and Erev, 2009; Ungemach et al.,
2009). In particular, it is unsolved whether choices in both for-
mats are essentially governed by the same processes. Alternatively,
and on top of obvious differences resulting from the fact that
information might have to be transformed before integration, they
might trigger qualitatively distinct cognitive processes. To address
these questions we herein test hypotheses concerning the processes
underlying one-shot experience-based decisions in comparison to
decisions from descriptions.
For an in-depth process analysis we resort to measurement of
information sampling using eye-tracking and analyze differences
in physiological arousal in response to speciﬁc task characteristics.
While previous research was limited to the analyses of information
sampling for experience-based decisions only (i.e., by looking at
button-press behavior), an eye-tracking approach provides insight
concerning information sampling in both paradigms. To the best
of our knowledge,we are the ﬁrst to apply ﬁxation-based-sampling
models to both experience- and description-based risky choice. In
addition, we directly test whether the degree of attention given to
outcomes corresponds to their actual probability of occurrence –
as is a cornerstone assumption of prominent sampling models for
risky choice (Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; Roe et al., 2001;
Johnson and Busemeyer, 2005). Findings from other eye-tracking
studies in the description paradigm indicate that there is at least
some relation between objective probability and attention in risky
choice (Fiedler and Glöckner, submitted) and in the valuations of
single gambles (Ashby et al., 2012).Nevertheless,other factors such
as outcomes (Ashby et al., 2012; Fiedler and Glöckner, submitted)
and emergingpreference (Innocenti et al.,2010;Glöckner andHer-
bold, 2011; Glöckner et al., 2012; Fiedler and Glöckner, submitted)
have been shown to inﬂuence attention as well (see also Armel
et al., 2008; Milosavljevic et al., 2010; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011).
UNDERWEIGHTING AND OVERWEIGHTING OF SMALL PROBABILITY
OUTCOMES
One of the main differences between decisions from experience
and decisions from descriptions concerns the implications of
observed choice behavior for the subjective evaluation of rare
events (i.e., outcomes with small probabilities). According to
Cumulative Prospect Theory (Kahneman andTversky, 1979; Tver-
sky and Kahneman, 1992), the most prominent model for risky
choice, there should be an overweighting of rare events. By con-
trast, it has been argued that the choice patterns observed in
decision from experience imply that rare events are underweighted
(Hertwig et al., 2004; Erev and Barron, 2005; Hertwig and Erev,
2009). Speciﬁcally, analyses of choices suggest that in description-
based tasks, people behave as if they overweight small probabilities,
whereas they behave as if they underweight small probabilities in
experience-based tasks. As described above, in description-based
tasks, participants mostly (64%) prefer a certain-outcome option
description-experience “gap” is much stronger in the feedback task as compared
to the sampling task (Camilleri and Newell, 2011b). In addition, the differences
between the two experience-based paradigms are actually larger than between
sampling and description.
with an intermediate expected value (e.g., 100%, 3C) over an
option with higher expected value but comprising an undesir-
able rare event (e.g., 80%, 4C, 20%, 0C); however, they show a
reversed pattern in an experience-based task (12% choices for
the certain alternative; Hertwig et al., 2004). Since the rare event
is undesirable, this is in line with underweighting the probabil-
ity of rare events in experience-based tasks but overweighting
them in description-based tasks. Vice versa, when the rare event
was desirable (e.g., 20%, C32, 80% C0), the risky alternative
was preferred by the majority of participants in the description-
based task, but only by the minority of the participants in the
experience-based task.
MODERATORS AND POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS
Two potential explanations of the description-experience “gap”
that were previously proposed are sampling bias and recency
effects2. Sampling bias refers to the tendency of individuals to
draw small (and thus biased) samples. In Hertwig et al. (2004), for
example, participants in the experience condition sampled only
a median of 7.5 outcomes per option, even though they could
have sampled endlessly without (monetary) costs. As a result,most
based their ﬁnal choice on a biased sample, which contained the
rare event less often than its objective probability3. In view of these
results and similar ﬁndings, some authors have proposed that the
description-experience gap is little more than sampling error plus
Prospect Theory (Fox and Hadar, 2006), suggesting that “people
make equivalent choices when they use equivalent information to
base their decision (on), regardless of presentation mode” (Camil-
leri and Newell, 2011a, p. 282). Indeed, recent studies show that
the description-experience gap reduces under conditions in which
more representative sampling is induced (e.g., Ungemach et al.,
2009; Camilleri and Newell, 2011a) or when large representative
samples can be drawn in parallel and very speedily (Hilbig and
Glöckner, 2011). However, although the ubiquitous importance
of sampling biases is out of question (e.g., Fiedler, 1996, 2008;
Fiedler et al., 2000; Kareev and Fiedler, 2006), it has been found
that even when individuals draw on large and representative sam-
ples the “gap” – though reduced – is not eliminated (Ungemach
et al., 2009). Ungemach et al. (2009) argue that sampling bias alone
can thus not account for the “gap.”
Recency effects refer to the tendency to focus on events more
recently encountered (e.g., Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992). Particu-
larly, only a subset of the most recent samples could be taken into
account in choice. Since rare events have a lower probability to be
included in these recent samples (simply because they are rare; see
2Two explanations that have also been suggested but will not be considered further
herein are that individuals might underestimate the probabilities of rare events (i.e.,
estimation error; Hertwig and Erev, 2009) and that individuals might use differ-
ent decision policies (Hills and Hertwig, 2010) reﬂected in either often switching
between options (i.e., piece-wise sampling) or continuous sampling within one
option (i.e., comprehensive sampling).
3In Hertwig et al. (2004) 78% of the participants made choices based on a sample
of information which contained the rare event less often than its objective proba-
bility. Note that this is not caused by unequal (biased) sampling between options
but due to a mere statistical effect that in small samples the majority of individuals
often do not get to see the rare event at all. More precisely, the mean of the relative
sampling frequency of the rare events equals their objective probability but due to
the skewness in the distribution the median falls below the mean.
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also text footnote 3), choices are likely to imply underweighting of
these events. However, ﬁndings concerning this recency effect are
equivocal. Some studies found that the second half of the samples
drawn by participants predicted choices better than the ﬁrst half
(Hertwig et al., 2004), while others failed to ﬁnd evidence for such
recency effects (e.g., Ungemach et al., 2009).
Thus, the accumulated empirical evidence suggests that rare
events are treated differently in description vs. experience-based
decision making (Hau et al., 2010). However, it has been argued
that biased sampling and recency cannot fully account for the
description-experience gap (Ungemach et al., 2009). As such,
knowledge on the mechanisms that contribute to the description-
experience gap is incomplete (Hertwig and Erev, 2009; Ungemach
et al., 2009; Ludvig and Spetch, 2011) which, in turn, highlights
the importance of directly examining underlying processes.
Hertwig and Erev (2009) consider the possibility that the dif-
ferent statistical formats of information presentation (i.e., stated
probabilities vs. experienced events) might trigger qualitatively
different cognitive processes. The current study aims to identify
such qualitative differences in processing, which stand in contrast
to obvious differences that merely result from the fact that infor-
mation has to be transformed in different ways before it can be
integrated into a decision. For example, participantsmay ﬁrst need
to form an estimate of the outcomes’ probabilities in the experi-
ence format, but then integrate outcomes and probabilities based
on the same cognitive process as participants who are provided
with the exact probabilities (in the description format). There-
fore, we focus on qualitative differences in terms of information
integration. An example would be that in one format participants
might rely on deliberately multiplying outcomes and (weighted)
probabilities and adding them up whereas in the other format they
may rely on automatic processes of memory retrieval in order to
decide which option is better.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
Herein,we investigated decisions from the perspective of evidence-
accumulation models (e.g., Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; Roe
et al., 2001; Johnson and Busemeyer, 2005; Raab and Johnson,
2007; Armel et al., 2008; Milosavljevic et al., 2010; Pleskac and
Busemeyer, 2010), an important class of process models for deci-
sion making (see also Rieskamp, 2008; Hilbig and Pohl, 2009;
Glöckner and Herbold, 2011; Hilbig and Glöckner, 2011). To bet-
ter understand the underlying processes of description-based and
experience-based decisions, we used a combination of process-
tracing techniques, including recording of eye-ﬁxations (via eye-
tracking), cognitive modeling, and physiological arousal measure-
ment (indexed by skin conductance response and pupil dilation).
Moreover, these measures were used on a set of decisions that
were randomly generated and somewhat more complex than in
previously used tasks (see also Hilbig and Glöckner, 2011). This
simultaneous reliance on multiple measures in a complex set of
stimuli extends the scope of previous examinations and enables
direct tests of (i) whether individuals indeed treat rare events dif-
ferently under experience vs. description, and (ii) which types of
processing differences contribute to this “gap.”
Eye-ﬁxation can provide important information about the
weight (or importance) given to different pieces of information
during the decision process (e.g., Raab and Johnson, 2007; Kra-
jbich and Rangel, 2011; Glöckner et al., 2012). Since several
evidence-accumulation models suggest that attention to outcomes
should be proportional to its importance or subjective probability
(Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; Busemeyer and Johnson, 2004;
Johnson and Busemeyer, 2005), eye-ﬁxations can be used to inves-
tigate whether there are differences in the visual attention given to
the rare events in both paradigms. If individuals overweight rare
events, then these events are expected to receive a higher relative
proportion of attention as compared to their objective probability.
By contrast, if rare events are underweighted, they will receive a
lower relative proportion of attention. Our data also allows testing
whether overt attention is related to probability of outcomes at
all. As mentioned above, some (but not all; see e.g., Armel and
Rangel, 2008, for a different approach) evidence-accumulation
models predict that attention to an outcome should increase with
its probability and predict that “the outcome probabilities dictate
where attention shifts, but only the outcome values are used in
determining themomentary evaluation”(JohnsonandBusemeyer,
2005, p. 843)4.
Cognitive modeling and model comparisons additionally yield
insight on how (and with which properties) the underlying
processes employed by decision-makers can best be described (e.g.,
Yechiam and Busemeyer, 2005; Yechiam et al., 2005b; Yechiam and
Ert, 2007). For example, evidence-accumulation models assume
that individuals repeatedly sample information about the avail-
able options, and use these samples to evaluate the options. The
sampled information is automatically accumulated in a serialman-
ner, until one option is perceived as sufﬁciently better than the
other, and thus chosen. In the following, we rely on naïve imple-
mentations of evidence-accumulation models (i.e., averaging and
summing models) to examine whether one-shot choices that are
made from description vs. experience can be captured by different
process models and how well the models explain behavior overall.
Averaging models assume that decision-makers average the sam-
pled outcomes for both alternative, and choose the option with
the higher average. By contrast, summing models assume that
decision-makers sum the sampled outcomes of each alternative,
and choose the option with the higher sum.
In both paradigms “samples of information”were operational-
ized by the number of eye-ﬁxations to respective outcomes. These
models were contrasted with a baseline ExpectedValue Model and
Cumulative Prospect Theory assuming objective probabilities and
outcomes of gambles. In the experience condition we additionally
tested a strategy assuming that participants chose the option with
the highest average outcome based on the subjectively sampled
outcomes. In addition, to test the recency account for decisions
from experience, this averaging model was also applied using
only recent subsets of samples. A previous model comparison by
Erev et al. (2010) indicates that (probabilistic implementations
of) Cumulative Prospect Theory predict choices best in decisions
4Note that this model statement is concerned with mental sampling. Therefore our
test necessitates accepting the empirically well supported eye-mind hypothesis (Just
and Carpenter, 1976) stating that individuals ﬁxate the information they process.
Also note that Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) is an as-if model,
which does not necessarily imply a relation between decision weights and attention.
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from descriptions but that the same theory performs poorly in
predicting decisions from experience. Decisions from experience,
in contrast, were found to be best described by an “Ensemble
model” relying on the average prediction of four models including
sampling models and Cumulative Prospect Theory.
Finally, potential differences in arousal between descriptions
and experience were investigated. We were interested in the inﬂu-
ence of the “difﬁculty” of the decision on arousal in the two
paradigms,where difﬁculty is indicated by the similarity of options
in expected values. Previous studies on probabilistic inferences
(Hochman et al., 2010) and risky choice (Glöckner and Hochman,
2011) show that arousal increases with increasing conﬂict between
the available information. Generalized to the risky choice para-
digm used in the current study, arousal should be high (vs. low) if
both gambles are similar concerning their expected value and/or
expected utility since “pros” and “cons” for the alternatives are
about equally strong in such a case (vs. one alternative being clearly
better than the other). Thus, differences in the pattern of arousal
for “easy”vs. “difﬁcult” choices between the two paradigms should
be an indicator for different underlying processes5. Such a com-
parison is critically informative concerning the question whether
the “gap” is caused by relatively trivial differences in preprocess-
ing of information only. If this were the case, a similar effect of
difﬁculty on arousal would be expected in the experience and the
description condition.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN
Forty-four students from the University of Bonn took part in
the experiment (52.3% female, mean age 23 years) and were ran-
domly assigned to the experience or the description condition. We
manipulated within-subjects whether the rare event was more
or less desirable and whether there was a high or a low differ-
ence in expected value (EV-diff) between gambles resulting in a
2 (experience vs. description)× 2 (rare event more vs. less desir-
able)× 2 (EV-diff low vs. high) mixed design. The experiment
lasted about 45 min. Participants were students recruited from the
MPI Decision Lab subject pool using the database-system ORSEE
(Greiner, 2004). Participants received a show up fee of 5C plus a
performance-contingent payment for the study yielding additional
payoffs between 0.1 and 29.8C (average total: 18.3C which equals
approximately 25.7 USD). The experiment was hence incentivized
and there was no deception involved.
MATERIAL
Participants made 60 decisions between two gambles with two
outcomes each that had an average EV of 10C. In 38 target tri-
als an option comprising a rare event (low-probability outcome)
was paired with an option comprising intermediate-probability
outcomes only (i.e., between 0.33 and 0.66). The remaining 22
decisions were ﬁller tasks with options comprising intermediate-
probability outcomes only (all between 0.33 and 0.66). For 20 of
the 38 target decisions, the low-probability outcome was desirable
5These differences may thereby be explained by multiple process accounts. We do
not aim to distinguish between them and they have to be further dissected in future
research.
(i.e., the rare outcome was more than twice as large as the non-rare
outcome),while for the other 18 target decisions it was undesirable
(i.e., the rare outcome was less than half as large as the non-rare
outcome). Half of the tasks were constructed so as to yield a small
difference in EV between gambles (EV-diff < 0.50C), whereas the
other half had a higher difference in EV (i.e., 3C< EV-diff < 4C).
All decisions were randomly generated under the above restric-
tions using gambles with positive outcomes only, the values of
which ranged from 0.10C to 30C. One of the target decisions
had to be excluded due to a programming error leaving us with
a total of 814 (22 participants × 37 decisions) choices per condi-
tions as basis for the analyses. All decision tasks, their assignment
to the within-subjects conditions, and average choices are listed in
Appendix A.
APPARATUS
Eye movements were recorded using the Eyegaze binocular sys-
tem (LC Technologies) with remote binocular sampling rate of
120 Hz and an accuracy of about 0.45˚. Images were presented
on a 17′′ color monitor (Samsung Syncmaster 740B, refresh rate
60 Hz, reaction time 5 ms) with a native resolution of 1280 × 1024.
Fixations were identiﬁed using a 30 pixel tolerance (i.e., added
max-min deviation for x and y-coordinates) and a minimum
ﬁxation time of 50 ms. Physiological arousal was measured by
recording skin conductance responses using a NEXUS-8 system
with a sampling rate of 32 samples per second. We used Butter-
worth (ﬁrst order) ﬁlters to correct for high frequency and low
frequency noise in the data6.
PROCEDURE
In the description condition we relied on a procedure similar to
the one used in Glöckner and Herbold (2011) which was slightly
adapted by including a new decision screen to make it as similar
as possible to the experience condition (Figure 1). Upon arrival,
participants were familiarized with the decision task by reading a
comprehensive instruction including screenshots of the paradigm.
In both conditions, they were instructed to sample information as
long as they liked. The decision screen was shown once partic-
ipants pressed the space bar. Decisions were made by pressing
buttons marked with “A” and “B” on the keyboard. In the experi-
ence condition, participants were additionally told that sampling
also worked through pressing buttons “A” and “B” (see Figure 1).
Individuals were calibrated and connected to the NEXUS (using
the middle ﬁnger and the ring ﬁnger of the non-dominant hand).
The experiment started with a test trial followed by the 60 deci-
sions7. In both conditions, the position in which the two gambles
were presented on screen (i.e., left or right) was counterbalanced
between subjects.
6We used a ﬁlter allowing a band from 0.1 to 1 Hz. To test the robustness of our ﬁnd-
ingswe also conducted the analysis using a FIRBandpass 128 ﬁlter [Parks–McClellan
(optimal)] with the same band which essentially led to the same results.
7Due to a programming error, order was randomized only in the experience con-
dition but it was ﬁxed in the description condition (using the order presented in
Appendix A). Note, however, that gambles were randomly generated, half of them
were side-reversed which was counterbalanced between subjects, and they were
intermixed with blocks of distractors. We therefore consider it very unlikely that
this difference could have inﬂuenced our results.We nevertheless cannot completely
rule out this possibility.
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FIGURE 1 | Procedure in the experience (top panel) and the description (bottom panel) condition. Note. RT means response time.
Each decision started with a blank screen (6 s) followed by a
ﬁxation cross (0.5 s) to center attention on the middle of the
screen. Next, the gambles were presented in an ellipsoid dis-
play which ensured that information was equally distant from
the initial ﬁxation point in both conditions (Figure 1). Infor-
mation for one gamble was presented on the left and for the
other on the right side. After (explicit or implicit) sampling
(information search phase) and pressing the space bar the deci-
sion screen appeared and individuals made their decision (deci-
sion phase). The analysis of ﬁxations was done for the infor-
mation search phase, whereas the analysis of arousal was done
separately both for the information search phase and the deci-
sion phase. The decision phase was exactly identical in the two
conditions.
RESULTS
SAMPLING OF RARE EVENT
In the experience condition we observed an average of 32
(Md= 30) information inspections, that is, for each decision, indi-
viduals pressed each of the two buttons about 16 times,which took
them 12.8 s on average. The sampling rate is on the upper end of
the spectrum observed in previous investigations which may be
due to the relatively large monetary incentives (Hau et al., 2010
report median total sampling rates between 11 and 33 in a review
of several previous studies). Consequently, sampling rates of low-
probability outcomes (M = 0.084, SE= 0.0045) were relatively
unbiased and reﬂected the average objective probabilities of these
outcomes well (M = 0.0745).
As described above, we use ﬁxations to outcomes as a proxy for
information sampling in both paradigms. Note that the infor-
mation display was much richer in the description condition
containing eight pieces of information (i.e., four outcomes and
four probabilities) than in the experience condition only showing
one outcome at a time (see Figure 1). In the experience paradigm,
there was an average of 53.5 ﬁxations to outcomes per decision
(Md= 48). Fixations also showed relatively unbiased sampling of
rare events which received 0.08 of the ﬁxations to the respective
gamble. This proportion is calculated as the number of ﬁxations
to the rare event divided by the total ﬁxations to the rare event
and the alternative outcome of the respective gamble (Figure 2).
As pointed out in the previous section, the presentation rate
of the rare event (i.e., how often the rare event was shown in
the gambles containing a rare event) was 0.084. Hence, partici-
pants did not show particularly increased or decreased ﬁxation
rates to rare events. Fixations roughly reﬂected the presentation
(=sampling) rate and were thus also in line with the objective
probability of the rare events. In the description condition, we
observed 43.9 ﬁxations on average (Md = 35) per decision with
more ﬁxations directed to outcomes (58%) than to probabili-
ties (42%). In contrast to the experience condition, rare events
were strongly oversampled in the description condition: the low-
probability outcomes received 0.50 of all ﬁxations within the
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FIGURE 2 | Proportion of fixations to the rare events compared to their
objective probability. Note. Proportions of ﬁxations are calculated using
ﬁxations to outcomes only. Proportions are calculated within gambles as
the number of ﬁxations to the rare event divided by the total ﬁxations to the
rare event and the alternative outcome of the respective gamble. Note that
in the experience condition, the sampling rate of the rare event was 0.084,
which is roughly reﬂects in the ﬁxation rate.
respective gamble which is signiﬁcantly higher than their objec-
tive probability, t (21)= 65.7, p < 0.001 (Figure 2)8. Note, that a
ﬁxation rate of 0.50 is expected if both outcomes receive equal
attention. For all 22 participants, the (ﬁxation-based) sampling
percentage of rare events was higher than the objective probability
of these events.
In sum, there was relatively unbiased sampling of rare events in
the experience condition but “oversampling” of rare events in the
description condition in terms of attention. In fact, there seems
to be no contingency between probability of the rare outcome
and the proportion of attention it receives in the descriptions
format (but, see Fiedler and Glöckner, submitted, for a more gen-
eral analysis). In contrast, in the experience condition when only
one piece of information is presented at a time, sampling rates
measured by button-press and by ﬁxation show a high degree of
convergence. We nevertheless use both in the model comparison
described below.
8Analyzing total ﬁxation durations instead of number of ﬁxations led to the same
conclusions.
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FIGURE 3 | Choices in line with overweighting of small probabilities.
Note. Higher scores in p(overweighting) indicate stronger overweighting of
rare events.
CHOICES
Overall analysis
We coded choices to indicate overweighting of small probabil-
ities (i.e., 1= choice for the gamble indicating overweighting;
0= otherwise; see Appendix A) and plot this variable in Figure 3.
Surprisingly, the option that – if chosenby the participants –would
indicate overweighting of small probabilities was not chosen more
often in the description than in the experience condition. The
experience condition even shows a tendency toward stronger over-
weighting of small probabilities as compared to the description
condition.
Note that placing more weight to an undesirable outcome of a
gamble (i.e., an outcomewith a relatively lowmonetary value) nec-
essarily implies placing less weight on the more desirable outcome
in this gamble (holding expected value constant). Hence, if the
low-probability outcome were overweighted, the gamble with the
rare event should become more attractive with increasing values
of the low-probability outcome (c.f. Hilbig and Glöckner, 2011).
Consider, for example, a gamble paying 4C with 80% probabil-
ity and otherwise nothing. Overweighting the (undesirable) 0C
outcome would reduce the probability of choosing this option as
compared to an option comprising the same expected value, but
with only one sure outcome (e.g., 3.2C). Vice versa, if the 0C out-
come were replaced by, say, a 10C (and thus desirable) outcome,
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overweighting this rare event would increase the probability of
choosing this gamble (again compared to an option comprising
the same expected value, but with one sure outcome).
We therefore analyzed whether low-probability outcomes are
over- or underweighted by conducting a logistic regressions pre-
dicting choice of the option comprising the low-probability out-
come by its value (i.e., desirability; values are outcomes in Euro as
described in Appendix A), controlling for differences in expected
value. If low probabilities are overweighted, the proportion of
choices of the corresponding option should increase with increas-
ing value of the outcome (c.f. Hilbig and Glöckner, 2011). That is,
the odds-ratio coefﬁcient for Low-Probability Outcome should be
above one indicating that the probability for choosing the gamble
increases with the value of the low-probability outcome9.
As expected, signiﬁcant overweightingwas observed in decision
from description (Table 1, model 1; considering a one-sided test
which is justiﬁed due to our a priori hypothesis, see Baron, 2010).
Interestingly, however, we observed signiﬁcant overweighting also
for the experience condition (Table 1, model 2). The overall
analysis indicated that there was no difference concerning over-
weighting between conditions as indicated by the non-signiﬁcant
interaction term (Table 1, model 3).
In sum, although we ﬁnd oversampling of rare events in the
description condition as compared to the experience condition,
choice patterns in both conditions indicated overweighting of
rare events. Interestingly, this result speaks against the hypoth-
esis that decisions in both conditions are based on the same
9Here and in all following regressions we used cluster correction on the level of
subjects to correct for dependencies in errors caused by the repeated measurement
design (Rogers, 1993). We also conducted the analyses using multi-level random
effects models (i.e., random intercept), which leads to the same conclusions.
Table 1 | Logistic regression of choices for the gamble comprising the
rare event (pchoice).
(1) (2) (3)
pchoice
description
pchoice
experience
pchoice
overall
Low-probability outcome
(centered)
1.025+
(1.95)
1.045***
(4.03)
1.035***
(4.30)
Presentation format
†
0.982
(−0.09)
Presentation
format× low-probability
outcome
1.022
(1.30)
EV-difference 1.563***
(10.57)
1.422***
(6.12)
1.488***
(10.56)
N 814 814 1628
Pseudo R2 0.185 0.151 0.166
Exponentiated coefﬁcients representing odds-ratios (z statistics in parentheses);
cluster correction used at the level of participants to account for dependencies
due to repeated measurement.
† Coding: 0=descriptions, 1=experience (centered).
+p<0.10, ***p<0.001 (all two-sided test).
evidence-accumulation process of ﬁxation-sampled information,
since according to such models, low-probability outcomes should
have had much more relative inﬂuence on choices in descriptions
as compared to experience due to the strong oversampling in the
former (as reported in the previous section).
Determinants of choices in the experience condition
We split tasks depending on whether the rare event was sam-
pled (i.e., shown on the screen) (a) never, (b) once, or (c) more
than once and reran the logistic regression predicting choices
of the option comprising this low-probability outcome (again,
with the value of the low-probability outcome and EV-difference
as predictors). We found signiﬁcant underweighting of low-
probability outcomes for trials in which the rare event was not
sampled (odds-ratio = 0.97, z =−2.33,p = 0.02), but overweight-
ing for trials in which it was sampled once (odds-ratio = 1.08,
z = 5.50, p < 0.001) or several times (odds-ratio = 1.11, z = 7.44,
p < 0.001). Overweighting of rare events thus increases with the
number of times they are sampled as indicated by a signiﬁ-
cant Number of Samples ×Value of the Low-Probability Out-
come interaction (odds-ratio = 1.05, z = 5.21, p < 0.001). The
description-experience “gap” hence reduces with increasing num-
ber of samples drawn and might heavily depend on the fact that,
in typical studies,many individuals do not sample the rare event at
all. Thus, the high overall number of samples drawn in the current
study might contribute to the fact that no evidence for under-
weighting of small probabilities is implied by the choice patterns
in the experience condition.
COMPARING MODELS FOR RISKY CHOICES IN EXPERIENCE – AND
DESCRIPTION-BASED DECISIONS
Model speciﬁcation
To investigate the underlying processes more closely we calcu-
lated the predictive power of different naïve implementations
of evidence-accumulation models and compared them against
several competitors. Thereby, all models were implemented in a
stochastic manner using a logistic choice rule (details see below)
in which the probability of choosing a gamble increases with the
difference in value (V diff) between gambles. The models only dif-
fer in the way in which values V for each gamble are calculated
and therefore in V diff .
As basic comparison standard, we used two models that
relied on objective probabilities and outcomes or transforma-
tions of these. Speciﬁcally, we considered an expected value model
(EVobjective), and an implementation of Cumulative Prospect The-
ory (CPTobjective) with the parameters from Tversky and Kah-
neman, 1992 (i.e., α= 0.88, γ= 0.61, λ= 2.25; all outcomes
positive).
For the experience condition, participants might simply choose
the option with the higher average of outcomes that was sam-
pled by pressing buttons. We calculated predictions from such
sampling-based models, which rely on the sampled outcomes
for each gamble (or subsets of them). The ﬁrst implementation
takes into account all samples (SampAverAll). Note that partic-
ipants have no other information than the sampled outcomes.
Given this information deﬁcit (and ignoring opportunity costs),
SampAverAll is the optimal strategy to maximize chances to win
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money in this paradigm. As mentioned in the introduction, sam-
pling average models might also be implemented using the most
recent samples only. To test these alternative implementations, two
further models that average over the last 10 (SampAverRec10) or
the last ﬁve samples (SampAverRec5) per decision were calculated.
These sample sizes were used since estimated average samples for
recency (and also other sampling-based) models in Erev et al.,
2010, e.g., see Table 3C) were between 5 and 10 (but see Discus-
sion for limitations of this approach). To test whether summing
instead of averaging of outcomes can account better for the data,
we also included a model assuming summation of all sampled
outcomes (SampSum). Note that for all sampling-based mod-
els introduced in this section one sample refers to one sampled
outcome, independently of how often individuals looked at them.
More importantly, we considered averaging and summation
models implementing evidence-accumulation based on partic-
ipants actual ﬁxations. In these model variants, valuations of
gambles are based on the distribution of ﬁxations to speciﬁc
outcomes. Conceptually, ﬁxation-based summation models (Fix-
Summation) assume that preferences are constructed in a dynamic
process in which each ﬁxation to an outcome adds evidence for
the respective gamble which is proportional to the value of the
outcome. Fixation-based averaging models (FixAveraging) do the
same but additionally correct for the number of ﬁxations to each
gamble so that the option with the higher average evidence is
selected10.AppendixBprovides a formal descriptionof themodels
implemented.
For all models, we used a multi-level logistic regression model
to predict individual choices of the option comprising the rare
event based on difference in value between gambles (V diff).
Model estimation
We estimated the model ﬁt to the choice data using multi-level
(mixed-effect) logistic regressions assuming normally distributed
N (0, σ2u) random intercept ui according to:
f (z) = 1
1 + exp(−z) (1)
and
z = β0 + β1(Vdiff)it + ui (2)
with i indexing subjects and t indexing tasks.
All models have three estimated parameters (β0, β1, σ2u). The
best model was selected based on the Bayesian Information Cri-
terion (BIC, Schwarz, 1978). To test the stability of the estimation
we also reran the analyses using a logistic regression with cluster
correction for standard errors which provides pseudo R2 values
indicating how much variance can be explained by a model.
10Note that – in contrast to averagingmodels – summationmodels take into account
biased sampling toward one of the options. For decisions with all non-negative out-
comes increased attention toward one option should lead to a choice bias in favor
of this option. This implementation of ﬁxation-based summation models is simi-
lar to evidence-accumulation models suggested by Rangel, Krajbich and colleagues
(Armel et al., 2008; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011).
Model ﬁtting results
In the experience conditions, the ﬁxation-based averaging model
(FixAveraging) provided the best ﬁt to the data (Table 2). The
sampling-based averaging model taking into account all samples
(SampAverAll) performed nearly as well, whereas all other mod-
els turned out considerably worse. Models relying on only the
most recent samples performed poorly, as did the sampling-based
summation model and the ﬁxation-based summation model.
In the description condition, by contrast, Cumulative Prospect
Theory (CPTobjective) performed best, whereas both ﬁxation-
based models performed poorly. Overall, these ﬁndings indicate
that attention-based evidence-accumulation models can account
better for experience-based choices than for description-based
choices.
Robustness checks and further analyses
In the experience condition, sampling of outcomes and ﬁxations
to the respective outcomes are necessarily highly correlated. As
one would expect, the predictions of the two best models in the
experience paradigm SampAverAll and FixAveraging were there-
fore also highly correlated (b = 0.93, t = 93.60, p < 0.001). We
tested whether, despite this high degree of overlap, both mod-
els make unique contributions in predicting choices by including
both predictors simultaneously in a logistic regression (clustering
at the participant level and correcting for individual differences
using dummies). The predictors of both models remained signiﬁ-
cant atp < 0.05 indicating that bothmodels haveuniquepredictive
power.
We conducted further tests of whether modiﬁed implementa-
tions of the models mentioned above improve model ﬁt. First, one
might suspect that our implementations of ﬁxation-based models
Table 2 | Model comparison predicting choices for the rare event.
Model class Description Experience
BIC Pseudo
R2
BIC Pseudo
R2
OBJECTIVE PROBABILITY AND OUTCOME-BASED MODELS
EVobjective 871 0.18 858 0.12
CPTobjective 832 0.21 799 0.18
SAMPLING-BASED MODELS
SampAverAll 768 0.21
SampAverRec10 872 0.11
SampAverRec5 867 0.12
SampSum 876 0.11
FIXATION-BASED MODELS
FixAveraging 1009 0.05 767 0.22
FixSummation 991 0.07 828 0.17
Observations 813 751
BIC scores are from multi-level logistic regressions described in Equations 1 and
2; Pseudo R2 are from a logistic regression with cluster correction using the
same predictors. Low BIC scores and high pseudo R2 indicate a better ﬁt of the
model to the data. The best ﬁtting models for both conditions are in bold. Trials
were excluded from the comparison if there were no ﬁxations recorded to any
outcome within the respective trial.
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might be suboptimal since they take into account frequency of
ﬁxations only and ignore the duration of these ﬁxations. To test
this hypothesis, we calculated model implementations for the Fix-
Averaging and the FixSummation models in which each ﬁxated
outcome is weighted by the duration of the respective ﬁxation. In
both conditions, model ﬁt decreased when weighting ﬁxation by
duration compared to using frequency of ﬁxations. Second, in the
description condition, ﬁxations to outcomes and their probabili-
ties might both be considered to provide evidence of attention to
the respective gamble. We therefore implemented ﬁxation-based
models in which each ﬁxation to a probability was also counted
as evidence for the outcome connected with this probability. In
both implementations, the model ﬁt improved slightly (by about
three BIC points), which, however, does not change any of above
conclusions.
AROUSAL MEASURES: PUPIL DILATION AND SKIN CONDUCTANCE
RESPONSE
Finally, we analyzed increases in physiological arousal between
conditions and tasks as measured by (a) pupil dilation and (b)
skin conductance response. A focus was placed on differences in
affective responses to our manipulation of EV-difference between
conditions, indicating differences in processing. As dependent
measures we calculated peak arousal scores, that is, the maximum
increase of arousal as measured by pupil dilation and skin conduc-
tance from baseline (i.e., measured at ﬁxation cross presentation)
in the respective part of the decision process. We thereby con-
ducted analyses separately for the information search phase (i.e.,
in which the information about the options was presented and
sampled) and the decision phase (i.e., in which the decision screen
was presented). Due to unsystematic breakdowns of the NEXUS
system, we lost parts of the data for several participants, leaving us
with 33 (out of the 44) complete sets for the analysis of skin con-
ductance (15 experience, 18 description). Peak arousal scores for
pupil dilation and skin conductance response showed a medium
correlation [r = 0.34, t (35)= 2.13, p < 0.05; scores aggregated at
the task level].
Pupil dilation
For both conditions,we regressed pupil dilation scores on absolute
EV-difference (based on objective probabilities and outcomes),
controlling for effects of trial order by including trial num-
ber as predictor, and differences between subjects by including
subject dummies. In the description condition, pupil dilation
decreased with increasing EV-difference, which was not the case
in the experience condition (Figure 4, left). The effect in the
description condition turned out signiﬁcant both in the infor-
mation search phase [b =−0.014, t (21)=−3.03, p = 0.006] and
the decision phase [b =−0.010, t (21)=−2.11, p = 0.047]. In the
experience condition, the effect was not signiﬁcant [informa-
tion search phase: b =−0.00097, t (21)= 0.29, p = 0.77; decision
phase: b =−0.0029, t (21)=−0.66, p = 0.518]11 which also holds
11In the description condition trial order (jointly calculated over search and decision
phase) turned out signiﬁcant as well, b =−0.0022, t (21)=−4.16, p < 0.001, which
was not the case in the experience condition, b = 0.0002, t (21)= 0.47, p = 0.644. A
further regression analysis was conducted including two-way interaction terms for
when using experienced (i.e., subjectively sampled) probabilities
to calculate EV-difference instead of objective probabilities (both
p > 0.25).
Skin conductance response
We regressed skin conductance response scores on absolute EV-
difference, controlling for effects of trial order, and differences
between subjects by including subject dummies. The results nicely
converge with the ﬁndings concerning pupil dilation: skin con-
ductance response decreased with increasing EV-difference in the
description condition but not (or much less so) in the experi-
ence condition (Figure 4, right). EV-difference did not predict
arousal for the experience condition, neither in the information
search phase nor in the phase in which the decision screen was
shown (both p > 0.23). In the description condition, by contrast,
we found strong corresponding effects in both the search phase
[b =−0.034, t (17)=−2.31, p = 0.034] and the decision phase
[b =−0.022, t (17)=−3.04, p = 0.007]. Since the decision phase
was exactly identical in both conditions, the difference between
conditions indicates that there might be qualitative differences in
processing between both conditions that do not only concern triv-
ial differences in information search but also the way in which
information is integrated. We will discuss this issue in more detail
the Section “Discussion.”
Note, however, that the general level of arousal did not dif-
fer signiﬁcantly between conditions, neither for pupil dilation
[b =−0.009, t (43)= 0.5, p = 0.62] nor for skin conductance
response [b = 0.023, t (32)= 0.87, p = 0.40], and coefﬁcients even
pointed in opposite directions (condition dummy coded with
Experience= 1).
DISCUSSION
In the current work, we examined processing differences between
one-shot decisions from description vs. experience using eye-
tracking, cognitive modeling, and physiological arousal. Concern-
ing choices, we did not ﬁnd underweighting of low-probability
outcomes in experience-based decisions and therefore our results
do not replicate the description-experience gap in choices. It is
noteworthy that this also holds when considering the 37 deci-
sions independently (see Appendix A). Although we did not
expect this result, it is interesting since it is in line with recent
evidence pointing at important moderators for observing the
descriptions-experience “gap12.”
First, our ﬁndings are in line with Camilleri and Newell (2011b)
who ﬁnd that behavior in one-shot experience-based decisions
(i.e., sampling information and then making one decision that is
incentivized) leads to behavior more in line with decisions from
description compared to repeated experience-based decision (i.e.,
each sample is incentivized and individuals receive immediate
condition by EV-diff and condition by trial number (all variables centered) in the
model (but excluding subject dummies). As indicated by the trial order coefﬁcients
reported above, participants in the two conditions reacted differently on trial order
[IE: b = 0.0023, t (21)= 3.83,p < 0.001]. Most importantly, however, the interaction
effect of EV-diff and condition was signiﬁcant even when controlling for this effect
[IE: b = 0.0117, t (21)= 2.58, p = 0.013].
12Of course, it is also generally important to report non-replications to avoid the
problem of publication bias (Renkewitz et al., 2011).
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FIGURE 4 | Physiological arousal. Note. The graphs show predicted
peak arousal scores for Pupil Dilation (left panel) and Skin
Conductance Response (right panel) with high numbers indicating
high arousal. Both scores are differences from baseline measured at
presentation of the ﬁxation cross preceding the respective trial. Pupil
dilation scores are in millimeters and refer to changes in radius.
Graphs are based on a joint analysis over information search phase
and decision phase.
feedback; see also text footnote 1, above). Second, in our study,
participants sampled more than twice as often as participants in
the original study on one-shot experience-based decisions by Her-
twig et al. (2004). As a consequence of this low sampling rate, 78%
of their participants sampled the rare event less often than expected
(Camilleri and Newell, 2011b). We did not observe such a bias in
sampling. Therefore, our ﬁndings are in line with Ungemach et al.
(2009) in showing that the gap reduces with increasing sample size
and the argument that the effect is largely driven by biased samples
(Fox and Hadar, 2006; Camilleri and Newell, 2011b).
Most importantly, even though choices did not reveal a “gap”
betweendescriptions and experience, amore in-depthmodel com-
parison based on choices as well as an analysis of process measures
suggest that the underlying cognitive processes in the two types of
paradigms are markedly different.
EVIDENCE FOR QUALITATIVE PROCESSING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
DECISIONS FROM DESCRIPTION VS. DECISIONS FROM EXPERIENCE
Our ﬁndings indicate qualitative processing differences between
decisions from description and decisions from experience that
go beyond trivial differences concerning preprocessing of infor-
mation. As such, the current results speak against the hypoth-
esis that individuals merely transform information in an initial
preprocessing stage, but later rely on the same integration process
inbothparadigms.This conclusion is basedon threenovel ﬁndings
which we brieﬂy summarize in what follows.
First, the model comparison for choices indicates that notably
different models explain choices best in the two conditions, which
replicates and extends ﬁndings from Erev et al. (2010). Evidence-
accumulationsmodels assuming sampling of outcomes by ﬁxation
and linear integration of these outcomes, which have been sug-
gested as models for risky choices in general (Busemeyer and
Townsend, 1993), can account well for decisions in the experience
paradigm but not in the description paradigm. In the description
paradigm, by contrast, Cumulative Prospect Theory was the best
model, which converges with other recent ﬁndings from com-
prehensive model comparisons (Erev et al., 2010; Glöckner and
Pachur, 2012).
Second, we ﬁnd that an effect of EV-difference on arousal,
as measured by pupil dilation and skin conductance response,
can be found in description-based but not in experience-based
choices. If the same cognitive processes had been at work for
information integration in both conditions, the effect of EV-
difference on arousal should have been comparable. Together
with the modeling results, the physiological data suggests that
decisions from descriptions involve more complex mathematical
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processes of computation such as coherence construction (Glöck-
ner and Betsch, 2008; see Models for Decision from Description,
for details) or other ways of subjectively weighting outcomes (Ayal
and Hochman, 2009), which are highly affected by expected value
differences (seeAyal andHochman,2009;Glöckner andHochman,
2011). By contrast, experience-based decisions might involve sim-
pler processes based on linear integration and a comparison of the
averages of experienced outcomes13. These processes appear to be
more similar to accumulation of ﬁxation-sampled evidence until
a certain threshold is reached (Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993;
Raab and Johnson,2007;Krajbich andRangel, 2011).Alternatively,
theymight also be similar tomemory prompting (Dougherty et al.,
1999; Thomas et al., 2008) or instance-based learning (Lejarraga
et al., 2012)14. Presumably, these types of processes essentially
require little more than remembering what was previously seen.
Since these types of decisions are more easily constructed, they are
arguably less sensitive to task-difﬁculty manipulations (e.g., dif-
ferences in expected values). Of course, this interpretation of the
arousal results will require further tests in future research.
Third, the link between attention measured by overt ﬁxations
and weight placed on speciﬁc outcomes in the decision tasks seems
to be much stronger in decisions from experience than in deci-
sions from descriptions. In the latter, our ﬁndings indicate that
despite substantial ﬁxation-based oversampling of rare events,
there was relatively little overweighting and thus, ﬁxation-based
models perform relatively poorly (despite predictive power well
above chance-level). In the experience condition, by contrast, the
goodmodel ﬁt for ﬁxation-basedmodels indicates that the relation
between attention and weight is quite strong.
MODELS FOR DECISIONS FROM EXPERIENCE
The current ﬁndings speak to several important questions con-
cerning the speciﬁc processes underlying decisions from experi-
ence in the sampling paradigm. Speciﬁcally, they support the idea
that certain implementations of evidence-accumulation models
(Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; see also Roe et al., 2001; Raab
and Johnson, 2007; Jessup et al., 2008; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011)
can account well for processes in decisions from experience. In
addition, our data provide relatively clear hints on which imple-
mentations should be preferred: ﬁrst, models assuming averaging
of outcomes are superior to models assuming summing. This
speaks against models assuming evidence-accumulation without
standardization for the number of samples. Prominent evidence-
accumulation models for decision making are conceptually based
on the idea that there is amere process of accumulationwhich does
not include standardization for number of samples (e.g., Buse-
meyer and Townsend, 1993; Johnson and Busemeyer, 2005; Raab
and Johnson, 2007; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011). Second, mod-
els taking into account all samples account for behavior better
than recency-based models which rely only on a subset of sam-
ples. Note, however, that our investigation did not address models
which assume that the number of recently sampled outcomes is a
13One factor contributing to this might be the simpler information display in the
experience condition (see Figure 1).
14For a more general classiﬁcation of these kinds of processes and their role in
decision making, see also Glöckner and Witteman (2010).
free parameter that reﬂect individual differences in sampling size.
Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that such more complex
models, as well as models which assume decreasing weights for
outcomes that are less recent may further improve the predictive
power for participants’ behavior in decisions from sampling.
MODELS FOR DECISIONS FROM DESCRIPTION
In linewith prior evidence,our results indicate that choices in risky
decisions fromdescriptions can be described adequately byCumu-
lative Process Theory (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Glöck-
ner and Pachur, 2012)15. Nevertheless, process implementations
of this theory assuming serial stepwise calculations of weighted
sums have been rejected (Glöckner and Herbold, 2011). Instead,
processes that rely at least partially on more complex automatic-
intuitive mechanisms have received support. Process measures in
Glöckner and Herbold were most in line with implementations of
coherence construction models. The suggested adaptation of the
Parallel Constraint Satisfaction Model (Thagard, 1989; Holyoak
and Simon, 1999; Simon et al., 2004; Betsch and Glöckner, 2010)
to risky choice assumes that probability weighted outcomes are
used as competing pros and cons (i.e., cues) speaking for one or
the other option and that initial advantages of one option are
accentuated by partially relying on automatic-intuitive processes.
The effect of conﬂict manipulated by decreasing EV-difference (as
opposed to coherence) on arousal observed in the current study
provides further support for this approach, and is in line with
previous ﬁndings demonstrating a link between coherence and
arousal (Hochman et al., 2010; Glöckner and Hochman, 2011). As
noted above, the arousal ﬁndingsmight,however, also be explained
by other mechanisms and further research is needed to investigate
the processes underlying risky choice from description.
SUMMARY
The current results demonstrate that there are considerable dif-
ferences in the cognitive processes underlying one-shot decisions
from experience vs. description. In experience-based decisions,
individuals are not explicitly provided with probability infor-
mation and therefore evaluate options in a way that can be
well-captured by naïve evidence-accumulation models assuming
averaging of all ﬁxation-sampled outcomes. The process seems to
be based on a linear integration and a comparison of the averages.
Thus, the difference between expected values of options does not
inﬂuence arousal. Decisions from descriptions, by contrast, can-
not be described well by ﬁxation-based evidence-accumulation.
Choices are more in line with Cumulative Prospect Theory, which,
however, does not claim to describe processes. The ﬁndings that
(i) different models account for choices best in the two paradigms,
(ii) arousal increases with difference in expected value between
options only in descriptions but not in experience, and (iii) the
link between attention and weight given to certain outcomes is
much stronger in experience indicate that qualitatively different
kinds of processes are at work.
15It should be noted that CPT has been rejected in favor of competing models in
complex multi-outcome risky choices (Birnbaum, 2006, 2008a,b) but it is nonethe-
less considered a good paramorphic model for risky choices between two options
with two outcomes each.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Gamble comprising rare event Alternative gamble Desirable rare event EV-diff Percentage choosing the
low-probability option
Description Sampling
(N =22) (N =22)
10.4C (0.94)/27.3C (0.06)a,b 12.6C (0.63)/0.2C (0.37) Yes High 1 0.818*
26C (0.09)/10.4C (0.91)a,b 11.7C (0.60)/4.1C (0.40) Yes High 1 0.864+
7C (0.91)/18C (0.09)a 3.4C (0.61)/23.8C (0.39)b Yes High 0.591 0.409
7.3C (0.93)/23.8C (0.07)a 3.9C (0.60)/23C (0.40)b Yes High 0.409 0.682+
7.3C (0.94)/27C (0.06)a 3.9C (0.60)/23.5C (0.40)b Yes High 0.318 0.591+
25.7C (0.05)/10.6C (0.95)a,b 19.7C (0.40)/0.10C (0.60) Yes High 1 0.955
10.6C (0.92)/23.5C (0.08)a,b 1.1C (0.59)/17.9C (0.41) Yes High 1 0.909
22.8C (0.06)/7.6C (0.94)a 5.9C (0.55)/20.2C (0.45)b Yes High 0.273 0.455
26.8C (0.07)/10.3C (0.93)a,b 13C (0.60)/1.5C (0.40) Yes High 1 0.909
23.7C (0.06)/7.1C (0.94)a 24C (0.41)/3.6C (0.59)b Yes High 0.409 0.682+
8.7C (0.90)/1.6C (0.10)b 1.2C (0.35)/16.7C (0.65)a No High 0.682 0.455
0.4C (0.08)/8.4C (0.92)b 8.6C (0.39)/13.1C (0.61)a No High 0.091 0.045
0.1C (0.05)/9.3(0.95) 24.4C (0.40)/3.5C (0.60)a,b No High 0.273 0.364
6.1C (0.09)/12.7(0.91)b 10C (0.43)/7.2C (0.57)a No High 0.864 0.909
1.7C (0.08)/8.8C (0.92) 9.8C (0.47)/13.7C (0.53)a,b No High 0.045 0.045
12.3C (0.93)/0.70C (0.07)b 9C (0.54)/7.3C (0.46)a No High 0.273 0.545+
6.1C (0.05)/12.5C (0.95)b 2.3C (0.56)/16C (0.44)a No High 1 0.864+
1.5C (0.09)/12.5C (0.91)b 12.7C (0.61)/0.10C (0.39)a No High 0.955 0.909
12.2C (0.94)/3.7C (0.06)b 2.3C (0.39)/12.2C (0.61)a No High 0.909 0.955
1.7C (0.06)/8.4C (0.94) 13C (0.52)/10.3C (0.48)a,b No High 0.045 0
24.4C (0.07)/9C (0.93)a,b 5.8C (0.42)/12.8C (0.58) Yes Low 0.682 0.818
29.4C (0.10)/8C (0.90)a 12.3C (0.57)/7.3C (0.43)b Yes Low 0.636 0.682
9.6C (0.94)/22.9C (0.06)a,b 12.1C (0.43)/8.7C (0.57) Yes Low 0.727 0.727
8.7C (0.91)/18.3C (0.09)a 15.5C (0.46)/5.2C (0.54)b Yes Low 0.545 0.773
26.5C (0.09)/8.3C (0.91)a 1.9C (0.36)/15C (0.64)b Yes Low 0.818 0.864
8.6C (0.91)/22.7C (0.09)a 5.5C (0.43)/13.2C (0.57)b Yes Low 0.682 0.636
29.8C (0.07)/8.9C (0.93)a,b,c 2.7C (0.47)/17.1C (0.53) Yes Low
9C (0.92)/18.2C (0.08)a,b 5.3C (0.48)/13.3C (0.52) Yes Low 0.773 0.818
8.8C (0.92)/24.2C (0.08)a 5.4C (0.35)/13.2C (0.65)b Yes Low 0.591 0.773
9C (0.91)/21.3C (0.09)a 13.2C (0.45)/8.4C (0.55)b Yes Low 0.727 0.5
1C (0.08)/10.7C (0.92) 20.3C (0.45)/1.9C (0.55)a,b No Low 0.727 0.591
2.9C (0.06)/10.6C (0.94) 1.2C (0.65)/27.5C (0.35)a,b No Low 0.864 0.818
1.4C (0.09)/10.3C (0.91) 14.8C (0.40)/6C (0.60)a,b No Low 0.727 0.227*
4C (0.06)/11.2C (0.94)b 2.8C (0.53)/18.3C (0.47)a No Low 0.682 0.545
5C (0.08)/10.8C (0.92)b 2.1C (0.57)/19.9C (0.43)a No Low 0.591 0.591
2.2C (0.08)/10.2C (0.92) 4.4C (0.47)/14.2C (0.53)a,b No Low 0.591 0.864*
2.7C (0.05)/10.6C (0.95)b 5.5C (0.57)/16.2C (0.43)a No Low 0.773 0.636
9.8C (0.92)/4.3C (0.08) 1.1C (0.37)/14.9C (0.63)a,b No Low 0.909 0.682+
The table shows all gambles and the probabilities of choosing the gamble with the low-probability outcome.Two-sample z-tests for equal proportions were conducted
comparing percentages between conditions.
aGamble should be more often chosen if small probabilities are overweighted.
bGamble with the higher expected value.
cDecision excluded from analysis due to partially wrong information presentation caused by a programming error.
+p<0.10; *p<0.05.
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APPENDIX B
Summation models
To implement summation models we calculate V diff as follows:
Vdiff =
(
f
f
A1
oA1 + f fA2oA2
)
−
(
f
f
B1
oB1 + f fB2oB2
)
(A1)
Where A and B represent the two choice options, O represent
the outcome, 1 and 2 the ﬁrst and second outcome of each option,
and f
f
X indicate the number of ﬁxations to the outcomes X.
Averaging models
For averaging models, the sums of sampled outcomes for each
option were additionally standardized by the total number of
ﬁxations to the respective option according to:
Vdiff =
(
f
f
A1
oA1 + f fA2oA2
)
f
f
A1
+ f fA2
−
(
f
f
B1
oB1 + f fB2oB2
)
f
f
B1
+ f fB2
. (A2)
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